四川省达州市人民政府办公室


达州市人民政府办公室转发四川省人民政府办公厅关于印发《四川省评标专家库管理办法》的通知的通知

达市府办[2003]54号


现将《四川省人民政府办公厅关于印发（四川省评标专家库管理办法）的通过》（川办发[2003]13号）转发给你们，请认真贯彻执行。



《四川省评标专家库管理办法》已经省政府第十届二次常务会议讨论通知，现印发你们，请认真贯彻执行

四川省评标专家库管理办法


第一条 为了规范评标活动，打破行业和地区垄断，防止不正当交易和腐败现象，实现专家资源共享，保证评标结果的公平、公正，根据《中华人民共和国招标投标法》、《四川省工程建设项目招标投标管理若干规定》，制定本办法。
第二条 省人民政府建立全省统一的、综合性的四川省评标专家库。省人民政府授权省发展计划委员会负责四川省评标专家库的组织实施工作。
省级各部门原有的专家名册纳入四川省评标专家库统一管理。各市、州、县（市、区）人民政府及其部门不得设立评标专家库。
第三条 四川省评标专家管理委员会由省政府办公厅、省计委、省经贸委、省人事厅。省监察厅、省财政厅、省建设厅、省交通厅、省水利厅、省科技厅、省信息产业厅、省外经贸厅、省政府法制办公室、省政府政务服务中心、成都铁路局、西南民航管理局等单位派员组成，负责评标专家的认定和管理。管理委员会下设办公室，办公室设在省计委，负责日常管理工作。
第四条 四川省评标专家库由工业（含内贸）、外经贸、建设、市政工程、农林、水利、交通、能源、环保、铁道、民航、信息和法律等相关行业或产业符合本办法规定条件的专家组成。
第五条 评标专家应符合下列条件：
（一）从事相关专业领域工作满8年并具有高级职称或同等专业水平。
（二）熟悉有关招标投标的法律法规和政策，并具有与招标项目类似的实践经验。
（三〕能够认真、公正、诚实、廉洁地履行职责。
（四）身体健康，能胜任评标工作。
（五）国家规定的其他情形。
第六条 符合第五条规定条件的人员可以向四四川省评标专家管理委员会办公室（以下简称管委办）提出申请（包括单位推荐和个人申请），并按规定报送相关材料。由管委办对申请人送行初步审查，经审查符合条件的，参加管委办统一组织的招标法律、法规知识及评标技能、职业道德的培训和有关招投标法律、法规和政策的考试。
考试合格的人员经四川省评标专家管理委员会认定符合评标专家条件的，颁发评标专家证书，纳入四川省评标专家库统一管理。
有下列情形之一的，木予颁发评标专家证书：
（一）无民事行为能力或者限制民事行为能力的。
（二）受过刑事处罚的，但过失犯罪的除外。
（三）被开除公职或者曾被取消评标专家资格的。
第七条 评标专家的权利：
（一）接受招标人或其委托的招标代理机构聘请，担任招标项目评标委员会成员。
（二）按照评标标准和方法对投标文件进行独立评审，不受任何干预。
（三）按照有关规定，接受评标劳务报酬。
第八条 评标专家的义务：
（一）认真执行招标法律、法规和有关政策，遵循公平、公正、科学、择优的原则，客观公正地履行职责，遵守职业道德，对所提出的评审意见承担责任。
（二）对评标过程保密，不得透露对投标文件的评审和比较、中标候选人的推荐情况以及与评标有关的技术经济秘密或其他情况。
（三）遵守评标纪律，不得与任何投标人或者与招标结果有直接或者间接利害关系的人进行私下接触，不得收受投标人或其他利害关系人的财物或其他好处。
第九条 在四川省内全部或者部分使用国有资金投资或者国家融资且依法必须进行招标的工程建设项目，评标专家必须从四川省评标专家库中确定。
国务院部委直接管理招投标的项目，国家另有规定的从其规定。
使用国际组织或者外国政府贷款、援助资金的项目进行招标，贷款方、资金提供方对确定评标专家有不同规定的，可以适用其规定。
经管委办批准，也可以从国家级专家或其他省级以上专家库中随机确定评标专家。
第十条 违反前条规定确定评标专家的，相关行政监督部门应当依照法律、法规、规章规定认定其评标无效；招标人应按本办法的规定重新确定专家，组成评标委员会重新进行评标。给他人造成损失的，招标人依法承担赔偿责任。
第十一条 省重大建设项目评标专家的抽取在省政府政务服务中心的网络终端进行；省管的其他项目评标专家的抽取可以在省政府政务服务中心的网络终端进行，或者按职责分工分别在省经贸委、省财政厅、省建设厅、省交通厅、省水利厅、省信息产业厅、省外经贸厅、成都铁路局、西南民航管理局等招投标行政监督部门设立的网络终端进行。
各市、州、县所属的项目或核准的招标项目在其当地政府政务服务中心或者发展计划部门设立的网络终端进行。
第十二条 评标专家名单应于开标时确定。省重大建设项目的评标专家必须具有高级职称。评标专家名单在中标结果确定前应当保密。
评标专家由招标人或其委托的招标代理机构负责抽取。需要核准招标事项（招标方案）的项目，招标人或其委托的招标代理机构必须持核准招标的文件，各计算机网络终端才能办理抽取手续。
确定评标专家必须在有关部门的监督下进行。其中，重大建设项目评标专家的抽取应在发展计划部门和有关部门的监督下进行。
评标专家确定后，应对评标专家的抽取过程，最终确定的评标专家进行书面记录；计算机网络终端操作人员、招标人或其委托的招标代理机构、监督人员应在书面记录上签字。
第十三条 评标专家的确定，应当采取随机抽取的方式。
下列项目，采取随机抽取方式确定的专家难以胜任的，省市重大建设项目经同级发展计划部门批准，其他项目经同级其他行政监督部门批准，可以由招标人直接确定：
（一）因技术特别复杂、专业性要求特别高，专家名册无满足条件的专家或者满足条件的专家不足8人的。
（二）国家有特殊要求的项目。
依法必须招标的项目，招标人组建的评标委员会成员人数应当为5人以上的单数，其中招标人的代表以外的技术、经济等方面的专家不得少于成员总数的三分之二。
第十四条 有下列情形之一的，评标专家不得担任该项目的评标委员会成员：
（一）投标人主要负责人的近亲属。
（二）项目主管部门的人员。
（三）与投标人有其他社会关系或者经济利益关系，可能影响对投标公正评审的。
评标委员会成员有前款规定情形之一的，应当主动提出回避。不主动提出回避的，招标人或行政监督部门一经发现，应立即终止其评标活动并给予警告；情节严重的由四川省评标专家管理委员会取消评标专家资格。
第十五条 评标专家参加评标活动应持证上岗，独立评标。
评标专家所在单位应对评标专家参加培训和评标活动给予支持。
第十六条 各招投标行政监督部门应依照职责分工加强对评标专家评标活动的监督。
各部门应将监督中发现的问题，及时通知四川省评标专家管理委员会。
第十七条 在评标过程中发现专家存在徇私舞弊、不按规定评标、违反回避规定等行为的，终止该专家评标活动，按规定另行确定专家进行评标。
在评标工作完成后发现专家存在徇私舞弊、不按规定评标、违反回避规定等行为的，经参与监督的部门审查后共同认定、未对评标结果造成实质影响的，评标有效；经参与监督的部门审查后共同认定，对评标结果成实质影响的，应依照法律、法规、规章规定认定其评标无效，并由招标人按规定重新组织评标。
第十八条 四川省评标专家管理委员会对四川省评标专家库的专家实行动态管理，评标专家每届聘期3年，可以连聘。四川省评标专家管理委员会应当建立健全评标专家继续教育制度和考核评价制度。
四川省评标专家库的专家应按规定参加四川省评标专家管理委员会组织的继续教育。
四川省评标专家管理委员会每3年对评标专家的评标业绩、廉洁公正等进行一次综合考核，有下列行为或原因之一的，终止其评标专家资格：
（一）继续教育、综合考核不合格的。
（二）两次无正当理由无故不参加评标的。
（三）因身体健康原因不能胜任评标工作的。
（四）因工作调动，不再适宜担任评标专家的。
（五）因个人原因，经本人申请不再担任评标专家的。
第十九条 评标专家违反本办法第八条规定或在评标活动中徇私舞弊，个人评审意见严重偏离评标原则、标准和方法，未能公正履行职责的，由四川省评标专家管理委员会取消其评标专家资格，并可公开曝光。有违反《招标投标法》及有关规定的，依法予以处罚。
在招标、评标以及其他与招标投标有关活动中从事违法行为而受行政处罚或刑事处罚的，由四川省评标专家管理委员会取消其评标专家资格。
依照本办法规定被取消评标专家资格的，由有关监督部门备案，终身不得再参加任何依法必须进行招标的项目的评标。
第二十条 监察机关应当加强对参与评标专家认证和管理工作活动的国家机关、国家公务员的监察。
第二十一条 本办法自发布之日起施行。
本办法发布后，各地、各部门已经颁布的规范性文件，凡与本办法相抵触的，一律停止执行。
Chapter VIII
Strengthening of the Multilateral System


Art. 23 of the DSU deals, as indicated by its title, with the “Strengthening of the Multilateral System”. Its overall design is to prevent WTO Members from unilaterally resolving their disputes in respect of WTO rights and obligations. It does so by obligating Members to follow the multilateral rules and procedures of the DSU. Art. 23 of the DSU reads:

“Strengthening of the Multilateral System
1. When Members seek the redress of a violation of obligations or other nullification or impairment of benefits under the covered agreements or an impediment to the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements, they shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of this Understanding.
2. In such cases, Members shall:
(a) not make a determination to the effect that a violation has occurred, that benefits have been nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements has been impeded, except through recourse to dispute settlement in accordance with the rules and procedures of this Understanding, and shall make any such determination consistent with the findings contained in the panel or Appellate Body report adopted by the DSB or an arbitration award rendered under this Understanding;
(b) follow the procedures set forth in Article 21 to determine the reasonable period of time for the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings; and
(c) follow the procedures set forth in Article 22 to determine the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations and obtain DSB authorization in accordance with those procedures before suspending concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements in response to the failure of the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings within that reasonable period of time.”

In this section, to end this book, the author means to take a precise overlook on the nature of obligations under Art. 23 of the DSU as a whole by referring to two panels’ reports in part. In this respect, the Panel in US-Sections 301-310 (DS152) rules: 1
“On this basis [provision of Article 23], we conclude as follows:
(a)It is for the WTO through the DSU process - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine that a WTO inconsistency has occurred (Article 23.2(a)).
(b)It is for the WTO or both of the disputing parties, through the procedures set forth in Article 21 - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine the reasonable period of time for the Member concerned to implement DSB recommendations and rulings (Article 23.2(b)).
(c)It is for the WTO through the procedures set forth in Article 22 - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine, in the event of disagreement, the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations that can be imposed as a result of a WTO inconsistency, as well as to grant authorization for the actual implementation of these suspensions.
Article 23.2 clearly, thus, prohibits specific instances of unilateral conduct by WTO Members when they seek redress for WTO inconsistencies in any given dispute. This is, in our view, the first type of obligations covered under Article 23.
Article 23.1 is not concerned only with specific instances of violation. It prescribes a general duty of a dual nature. First, it imposes on all Members to ‘have recourse to’ the multilateral process set out in the DSU when they seek the redress of a WTO inconsistency. In these circumstances, Members have to have recourse to the DSU dispute settlement system to the exclusion of any other system, in particular a system of unilateral enforcement of WTO rights and obligations. This, what one could call ‘exclusive dispute resolution clause’, is an important new element of Members' rights and obligations under the DSU. Second, Article 23.1 also prescribes that Members, when they have recourse to the dispute settlement system in the DSU, have to ‘abide by’ the rules and procedures set out in the DSU. This second obligation under Article 23.1 is of a confirmatory nature: when having recourse to the DSU Members must abide by all DSU rules and procedures.
Turning to the second paragraph under Article 23, Article 23.2 - which, on its face, addresses conduct in specific disputes - starts with the words ‘[i]n such cases’. It is, thus, explicitly linked to, and has to be read together with and subject to, Article 23.1.
Indeed, two of the three prohibitions mentioned in Article 23.2 - Article 23.2(b) and (c) - are but egregious examples of conduct that contradicts the rules and procedures of the DSU which, under the obligation in Article 23.1 to ‘abide by the rules and procedures’ of the DSU, Members are obligated to follow. These rules and procedures clearly cover much more than the ones specifically mentioned in Article 23.2. There is a great deal more State conduct which can violate the general obligation in Article 23.1 to have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of the DSU than the instances especially singled out in Article 23.2.
Article 23 interdicts, thus, more than action in specific disputes, it also provides discipline for the general process WTO Members must follow when seeking redress of WTO inconsistencies. A violation of the explicit provisions of Article 23 can, therefore, be of two different kinds. It can be caused
(a)by an ad hoc, specific action in a given dispute, or
(b)by measures of general applicability, e.g. legislation or regulations, providing for a certain process to be followed which does not, say, include recourse to the DSU dispute settlement system or abide by the rules and procedures of the DSU.”
Furthermore, as to Art. 23 of the DSU, the Panel in US-Import Measures (DS165) confirms the ruling developed in US-Sections 301-310, and states: 2
“The Panel believes that the adopted Panel Report on United States - Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 (‘US - Section 301’) has confirmed the crucial importance that WTO Members place on the dispute settlement system of the WTO, as the exclusive means to redress any violations of any provisions of the WTO Agreement. This fundamental principle is embedded in Article 23 of the DSU: …
An important reason why Article 23 of the DSU must be interpreted with a view to prohibiting any form of unilateral action is because such unilateral actions threaten the stability and predictability of the multilateral trade system, a necessary component for "market conditions conducive to individual economic activity in national and global markets" which, in themselves, constitute a fundamental goal of the WTO. Unilateral actions are, therefore, contrary to the essence of the multilateral trade system of the WTO. As stated in the Panel Report on US - Section 301:
‘7.75 Providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system is another central object and purpose of the system which could be instrumental to achieving the broad objectives of the Preamble. Of all WTO disciplines, the DSU is one of the most important instruments to protect the security and predictability of the multilateral trading system and through it that of the market-place and its different operators. DSU provisions must, thus, be interpreted in the light of this object and purpose and in a manner which would most effectively enhance it.’
The structure of Article 23 is that the first paragraph states the general prohibition or general obligation, i.e. when Members seek the redress of a WTO violation, they shall do so only through the DSU. This is a general obligation. Any attempt to seek ‘redress’ can take place only in the institutional framework of the WTO and pursuant to the rules and procedures of the DSU.
The prohibition against unilateral redress in the WTO sectors is more directly provided for in the second paragraph of Article 23. From the ordinary meaning of the terms used in the chapeau of Article 23.2 (‘in such cases, Members shall’), it is also clear that the second paragraph of Article 23 is ‘explicitly linked to, and has to be read together with and subject to, Article 23.1’. That is to say, the specific prohibitions of paragraph 2 of Article 23 have to be understood in the context of the first paragraph, i.e. when such action is performed by a WTO Member with a view to redressing a WTO violation.
We also agree with the US - Section 301 Panel Report that Article 23.2 contains ‘egregious examples of conduct that contradict the rules of the DSU’ and which constitute more specific forms of unilateral actions, otherwise generally prohibited by Article 23.1 of the DSU.
‘[t]hese rules and procedures [Article 23.1] clearly cover much more than the ones specifically mentioned in Article 23.2. There is a great deal more State conduct which can violate the general obligation in Article 23.1 to have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of the DSU than the instances especially singled out in Article 23.2.’
The same Panel identified a few examples of such instances where the DSU could be violated contrary to the provisions of Article 23. Each time a Member seeking the redress of a WTO violation is not abiding by a rule of the DSU, it thus violates Article 23.1 of the DSU.
In order to verify whether individual provisions of Article 23.2 have been infringed (keeping in mind that the obligation to also observe other DSU provisions can be brought under the umbrella of Article 23.1), we must first determine whether the measure at issue comes under the coverage of Article 23.1. In other words, we need to determine whether Article 23 is applicable to the dispute before addressing the specific violations envisaged in the second paragraph of Article 23 of the DSU or elsewhere in the DSU.
Article 23.1 of the DSU provides that the criterion for determining whether Article 23 is applicable is whether the Member that imposed the measure was ‘seeking the redress of’ a WTO violation. …
The term ‘seeking’ or ‘to seek’ is defined in the Webster New Encyclopedic Dictionary as: ‘to resort to, … to make an attempt, try’. This term would therefore cover situations where an effort is made to redress WTO violations (whether perceived or WTO determined violations). The term ‘to redress’ is defined in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as ‘repair (an action); atone for (a misdeed); remedy or remove; to set right or rectify (injury, a wrong, a grievance etc.); obtaining reparation or compensation’. The term ‘redress’ is defined in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as: ‘reparation of or compensation for a wrong or consequent loss; remedy for or relief from some trouble; correction or reformation of something wrong’. The term 'redress' implies, therefore, a reaction by a Member against another Member, because of a perceived (or WTO determined) WTO violation, with a view to remedying the situation.
Article 23.1 of the DSU prescribes that when a WTO Member wants to take any remedial action in response to what it views as a WTO violation, it is obligated to have recourse to and abide by the DSU rules and procedures. In case of a grievance on a WTO matter, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is the only means available to WTO Members to obtain relief, and only the remedial actions envisaged in the WTO system can be used by WTO Members. The remedial actions relate to restoring the balance of rights and obligations which form the basis of the WTO Agreement, and include the removal of the inconsistent measure, the possibility of (temporary) compensation and, in last resort, the (temporary) suspension of concessions or other obligations authorised by the DSB (Articles 3.7 and 22.1 of the DSU). The latter remedy is essentially retaliatory in nature.”



【NOTE】:
1. See, in detail, WT/DS152/R/7.38-7.46.
2. See, in detail, WT/DS165/R/6.13-6.23.



List of References

1 Sources of Legal Texts: http://www.wto.org; WTO Secretariat: The WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures (Second Edition), CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2001.